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AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO THE 
FCC's PROPOSED AMENDMENT: 
BROADCAST MEDIA CONCENTRATION 
RULES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Communications Commission (hereafter the 
FCC or the Commission) is authorized by Congress to regulate 
broadcasting "in the public interest, convenience or necessity."! 
This vague phrase has historically been interpreted by the FCC 
and the courts as mandating regulation that will insure that a 
diversity of viewpoints flourish on the airwaves, as well as estab-
lishing the best possible service to each geographic location.2 
The inherent scarcity of available broadcast channels makes to-
tal diversity of viewpoints impossible.s Those licensed to broad-
cast are placed in an advantageous position over others unable 
to gain access to the airwaves. To achieve their definition of di-
versity, the FCC has enacted numerous regulations aimed at 
overcoming this inherent imbalance.· One such set of regulations 
1. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 et. seq. (1970). 
2. See generally, CBS Inc. v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. 367, (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television 
Broadcast Stations, 45 F.C.C. 1476, 1476-1477 (1964), National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 
319 U.S. 190, (1943), F.C.C. Report on Chain Broadcasting (1941). 
3. Scarcity refers to the finite number of channels allocated on each broadcast band 
in each geographic area. It is one principal reason that the broadcast media does not 
receive the same absolute first amendment protection as the print media. Because of this 
inherent scarcity, government licensing is necessary in order to maintain order on the 
airwaves. Without scarcity, there would be no limit on channel availability, and therefore 
no cause for regulation. 
4. One regulatory focus is content regulation such as the Fairness Doctrine and the 
Equal Time Requirements. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976). The Fairness Doctrine mandates bal-
anced coverage by broadcasters of important public issues through two requirements. 
The first requires that broadcasters must devote a reasonable amount of broadcast time 
to discussing controversial issues of public importance. The second requires balanced 
coverage of these issues. If a broadcaster presents one viewpoint on an issue, it must 
afford reasonable opportunities for the presentation of opposing viewpoints. The Equal 
Time Requirements grant political candidates for the same public office equal opportuni-
ties for broadcast time. Both rules force the licensee to permit others access to its air-
space under certain circumstances. 
399 
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is the multiple ownership rules. II 
Promulgated in 1953, the multiple ownership rules prohibit 
any party from being a stockholder, officer or director or other-
wise holding any interest in more than seven stations within the 
same broadcast serviceS (i.e., seven FM, seven AM, and seven 
on-air television stations). The purpose of the multiple owner-
ship rules (or the Seven Station Rule)' is primarily twofold. 
First, the FCC wanted to limit economic concentration in the 
industry via station ownership.8 These regulations are founded 
on antitrust law principles and, as such, are basically economic 
in scope.9 The economic goal is to prevent monopolies from de-
veloping which would prevent competition in the industry. The 
second purpose of the rule is to "maximize diversification of pro-
gram and service viewpoints . . ." by diversifying ownership.lo 
Diversity is a first amendment concept. The first amendment 
protects the rights of both the speaker and the listener in receiv-
ing the widest possible variety of ideas.ll In broadcasting, these 
two interests often conflict. The S'upreme Court has held that 
when. the interest of the public outweighs the interests of the 
5. In the Matter of the Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules 
and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast 
Stations. Report and Order. 18 F.C.C. 288, 294-295 (1953) [Cited hereafter as the Multi-
ple Ownership Rules]. 
6. [d. at 295-297. 
7. This Rule is also known as the 7/7/7 Rule or the 7/7/7/5 Rule. The number five in 
the latter refers to a 1954 amendment to the Seven Station Rule. This amendment kept 
the total television station ownership number at seven, but restricted total VHF station 
ownership to five. In the Matter of the Amendment of Section 3.636 of the Commission's 
Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of Television Broadcast Stations, 
43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954). 
8. Supra, note 5, at 291-92. 
9. Authority for enforcement of antitrust matters generally falls to the FTC and/or 
the Justice Department. The Communications Act is silent with respect to regulating 
station ownership concentration. Within the strict definition of antitrust law, the FCC 
has no authority. United States v. Radio Corporation of America, 358 U.S. 334, 343 
(1959). However, the courts have held that the FCC has authority to regulate media 
concentration through ownership limitations. See generally, National Broadcasting Co., 
319 U.S. 190 and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Company, 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
While partially based on antitrust principles, the 7/7/7 Rule is not antitrust law, per se. 
10. See supra, note 5, at 291-292. 
11. Red Lion Broadcasting 453 U.S. at 390; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945); Diversity 
of available sources has been viewed as crucial to self-government. In the decision later 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Associated Press Judge Learned Hand wrote 
"[r]ight conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues .... " 
52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), Aff'd 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
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broadcasters, the rights of the viewers and listeners are para-
mount over the rights of the broadcasters.12 This purpose of the 
rule is geared toward protecting the public's right to receive a 
diversity of viewpoints. Thus, an odd mix of antitrust and first 
amendment principles is intertwined within the multiple owner-
ship rules. 
In September, 1983, the FCC issued for administrative com-
ment a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (hereafter Notice) 
aimed at amending the Seven Station Rule. l3 The three major 
reasons cited by the Commission for proposing the amendment 
were the arbitrariness of the Seven Station Rule,l4 the changed 
circumstances in the broadcasting industry since 1953,1& and the 
harm to diversity caused by the Rule despite its intended pur-
pose. lS The Notice did not cite a specific alternative to the Rule, 
but indicated a possible interim amendment in the numerical 
ceiling to fourteen on-air television stations and thirty-six radio 
12. Red Lion Broadcasting, 453 U.S. at 390. 
In Red Lion, the Court unequivocally held that the rights of viewers and listeners 
are paramount over the rights of broadcasters. The Court, in upholding the Fairness 
Doctrine (see, supra, note 4), stated: "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to pre· 
serve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather 
than to countenance monopolization of that market. . . It is the right of the public to 
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and exper-
iences which is crucial here." 453 U.S. at 390. 
Four years later, the Court limited this domination of viewer/listener rights over 
broadcasters by acknowledging that broadcasters have significant journalistic discretion 
in deciding how to fulfill their public interest obligations. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973). While this opinion 
did not overturn Red Lion, (and in fact established Red Lion as the major case in this 
field of law), the Court appeared to be pushing broadcasters and listeners/viewers into a 
more equal balance when determining continuing first amendment rights. 
The Court further muddled this area of law in 1981 by ruling that the Equal Time 
Requirements (see, supra, note 4), entitle legally qualified candidates for federal elective 
office to purchase reasonable amounts of time from broadcast stations on behalf of their 
candidacies. Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 394. The Court fell back on its reason-
ing from Red Lion, restating the Red Lion Court's preference of viewer/listener rights 
over broadcaster rights. CBS, Inc. v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. at 394. For an overview of these 
three decisions, see Polsby, Candidates' Access to the Air: The Uncertain Future of 
Broadcaster Discretion, SUP. CT. REV. 223 (1981). 
13. In the Matter of Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73,240, and 73.636 of the Com-
missions's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast 
Stations. General Docket No. 83-1009. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Adopted Sep-
tember 22, 1983; Released: October 20, 1983 49 Fed. Reg. 49438 (Hereafter cited as 
NOTICE). 
14. NOTICE at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442. 
15. [d. at 49442-49445. 
16. [d. at 49442-49443, 49445-49446. 
3
King: FCC and Media Regulation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
402 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:399 
stations (FM and AM combined).17 The Notice also indicated 
that the ultimate goal was the complete elimination of all nu-
mericallimitations on station ownership. IS According to the No-
tice, if the Seven Station Rule is eliminated, media concentra-
tion would be monitored by both the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).19 These agencies 
would use traditional antitrust law in monitoring undue concen-
tration in the industry.20 
This Comment will review the reasoning behind the Notice, 
and criticize its potential impact if adopted. The Comment will 
then consider other factors that should be considered if the 
Seven Station Rule is to be amended and suggest alternative 
proposals to those indicated in the Notice. . 
II. PROPOSED AMENDMENT To THE SEVEN STATION RULE 
Because there is no specific alternative to the Seven Station 
Rule offered for comparison by the Commission, the Notice is 
best analyzed by reviewing its reasoning.21 
The first argument is based upon changed circumstances in 
the broadcast industry since 1953.22 This argument focuses on 
the increased number of on-air broadcast stations2S and the re-
cent advancement of broadcast alternatives to television such as 
cable, direct broadcast satellite (DBS), multipoint distribution 
service (MDS) and video cassette recorders (VCRs), among 
others.24 
We believe that the growth in the numbe~ of 
over-the-air stations since 1953 constitutes a fun-
damental change in the nature of the media mar-
ket-place that of itself calls for a re-examination 
of our approach to national ownership limitations. 
Such action is consistent with the Commission's 
view that its rules and policies should be drawn 
17. ld. at 49450-49452. 
18. ld. at 49457. 
19. ld. at 49446-49447. 
20.ld. 
21. See supra notes 17 and 18, and accompanying text. 
22. NOTICE at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442-49445. 
23. ld., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443. 
24. ld. at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443-49444. 
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with an eye to the current market environment 
"26 
The FCC contrasts the "current market environment" to 
the 1953 market with the following evidence: The number of on-
air television stations operating in 1953 was 199. That number 
has increased by 466 percent to 1,127 in 1983.28 The number of 
FM stations has climbed 561 percent from 686 to 4,532.27 The 
number of AM stations has increased by ninety-two percent 
from 2,458 to 4,720.28 In addition, cable television has grown 
from an estimated 150 systems serving 30,000 subscribers in 
1953 to approximately 5,000 systems with twenty-two to thirty-
two million subscribers in mid-1983.2~ Cable now reachesso sixty 
percent of all television households, with thirty-five to thirty-
nine percent subscribing in areas reached. SI The subscription 
rate is predicted to rise to forty-five to fifty percent by 1985, and 
to sixty percent by 1993, according to the Notice.s2 
Other alternatives to on-air broadcasting which define the 
current market environment, according to the Notice, are the 
ninety-nine MDS systems, serving approximately 565,000 sub-
scribers.ss These MDS numbers are expected to expand signifi-
cantly "as a result of recent Commission action reallocating cer-
tain spectrum for multichannel MDS service."M Nineteen STY 
25. [d. at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. 
30. "Reach" is the equivalent of the total available market in a communications 
industry. Regarding cable, reach equals the total number of households having an oppor-
tunity to subscribe to at least one cable system. 
31. NOTICE, at 49443. 
32. [d. 
33. [d., at Fed. Reg. 49443-49444. "MDS" stands for Multipoint Distribution Ser-
vice. An MDS system is a fixed station transmitting omnidirectionaIly to numerous fixed 
receivers with directive antennae. The information transmitted may consist of private 
television, high speed computer data, or other communications capable of radio trans-
mission. The range of the transmission depends upon the power of the transmitter, the 
size and characteristics of the receiving antenna, and the existence of a line of sight path 
between the transmitter and receiver. The transmission is one-way, although the receiver 
may return communication through the simultaneous use of telephone lines. See infra, 
note 107. 
34. 48 Fed. Reg. 49443-49444. 
5
King: FCC and Media Regulation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
404 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:399 
stations serve 985,560 subscribers.35 Approximately 150,000 sub-
scribers received service from satellite master antenna television 
(SMA TV), with an expected growth to 500,000 subscribers by 
1984.36 Low power television and DBS are "expected to provide 
most Americans with additional viewing options in the near fu-
ture. "37 Another suggested option is the video cassette recorders 
and video disc players.3s Armed with this data, the Notice con-
cludes that "the potential for such national ownership concen-
tration as would tend to monopolize or threaten diversity is far 
less a matter of concern today than might have been the case in 
1953 ... "39 
The second argument offered is the arbitrary nature of the 
numerical ceiling.40 This arbitrariness is evidenced by the failure 
of the Seven Station Rule to account for factors such as the sig-
nal coverage of the individual station, the size of the population 
its programming reaches, or broadcasting frequency.41 For exam-
ple, an owner of a VHF station in New York City is on equal par 
with an UHF owner in Butte, Montana when tabulating station 
ownership under the Seven Station Rule!2 
Another reason given as support for amending the rule is 
that "it may serve both to enhance the power of the three major 
(television) networks and to preclude the initiation of new over-
the-air networks and programming."43 Although further expla-
nation is omitted from this section of the Notice, later discus-
sion indicates that the inability of some group owners to own a 
sufficient number of stations to generate a base for quality pro-
gram production prevents additional major national networks 
from forming. 44 Thus, the Seven Station Rule may actually limit 
diversification of program and serviceviewpoints.45 The Notice 
suggests that a "relaxation" of the rule may allow group owners, 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id., see infra, note 106, and accompanying text. 
39. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442. 
40. Id., at 49442. 
41. Id., at 49442-49443. 
42. Id., at 52. 
43. Id. 
44. Id., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446. 
45. Id. 
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other than the three major networks, to generate a sufficient 
amount of quality programming. This, in turn, may generate a 
sufficient base for competition on the same level as the three 
major networks.4e 
By maintaining regulations which tend to inter-
fere with development of additional program-
ming, the Commission may inadvertently be 
strengthening the significant role of the three ma-
jor networks in national program distribution. 
The Commission has recognized the historic role 
of owned-and-operated stations in development of 
the network system. It appears somewhat anoma-
lous to prevent potential competitors from realiz-
ing the similar advantages which might be ob-
tained through establishment of larger groups, so 
long as diversity is not harmed. . . In this regard, 
we note that an integrated firm can realize effi-
ciencies that are not obtainable when program-
mers merely contract· with stations for 
distribution.47 
The Notice further notes that the implementation of the 
Seven Station Rule was "to promote diversification of ownership 
in order to maximize diversification of program and service 
viewpoints as well as to prevent any undue economic concentra-
tion contrary to the public interest."4S It states that ensuring di-
versity of ownership in sources of information has traditionally 
been viewed as serving first amendment goals.49 However, such 
diversification "must give way, ... if ... 'public interest harms 
outweigh the potential gains that would follow' if the diversifica-
tion-maximizing action were taken."IIO When such diversification 
hinders the best conceivable service to the American public, it 
must give way to different approaches. The Notice concludes 
this argument by stating, "proper review of national ownership 
policy involves separate consideration of . . . First Amendment 
and economic policy issues . "111 
46.Id. 
47. [d. 
48. [d., citing Multiple Ownership Rules, supra, note 5, at 292-293. 
49. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446-49447. 
50. Id., at 48 Fed. Reg. at 49446 quoting FCC v. National Citizens Committee for 
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 804-805 (1978). 
51. 48 Fed. Reg. at 49446. 
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Economic policy issues are viewed in the Notice as derived 
from antitrust policy. Ill! However, "[t]he Commission has histori-
cally considered such matters under the public interest standard 
without regard to whether an actual antitrust violation is in-
volved."113 If the deterrence of economic concentration is one 
purpose of the rule, then this concern is better left to antitrust 
law. lI• Since the FTC and the DOJ regularly perform such activi-
ties, further review by the FCC on national ownership policy 
would be duplicative.1I1I The Notice suggests deferring national 
ownership-related antitrust matters to the DOJ and FTC on 
levels ranging from complete control being transferred to partial 
control being transferred, with the FCC and other agencies es-
tablishing a "formal liaison relationship."IIG Other antitrust 
problems, exclusive of ownership, could be delegated to the FTC 
and DOJ with an added option in civil matters of injunctive re-
lief via private civil suit under the Clayton Act. 117 
As an alternative to deferring to other federal agencies, the 
Notice indicates that the Commission "may choose to pursue de-
velopment of a methodology to assess economic concentration in 
the market(s) found relevant to national broadcast ownership."118 
The Commission "seeks a method of assessing concentration 
that could facilitate uniform treatment of ownership issues in all 
FCC-regulated media services."119 An index would be developed 
and utilized to determine if any individual transactions might 
lead to unacceptable levels of media concentration. GO 
The Notice next addresses the first amendment ramifica-
52.Id. 
53.Id. 
54.Id. 
55. Id., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49447. 
56.Id. 
57.Id. 
58.Id. 
59.Id. 
60. Id. The Notice suggests using a DOJ index to compare concentration in broad-
casting to concentration in other industries. It concludes that the broadcasting market is 
relatively unconcentrated in comparison to other industries such as breakfast cereal 
foods, refrigerators, and farm machinery. NOTICE, at 49446-47. 
Another problem with using traditional market concentration analysis is defining the 
nature of the relevant market. NOTICE, at 49439. The Notice suggests the relevant mar-
ket to be the national broadcast market (NOTICE, at 49445) with the merging of on-air 
television, radio, and other broadcast technologies as an inclusive within this market. 
NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. at 49448. 
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tions of the national ownership policy. It cites the threshold is-
sue regarding the first amendment and broadcasting as the "fur-
thering of political discourse so that debate on public issues may 
be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' "61 However, the Com-
mission concludes that national ownership rules do not govern 
diversity of voices in any local community.62 Thus, the question 
must deal with national political discourse, and the role of group 
owners as "gatekeepers" governing the flow of that discourse.63 
For the purpose of analyzing diversity of sources for national is-
sue information, the Notice argues for consideration of non-
broadcast sources such as newspaper and magazines. These or-
gans also affect the national information flow, according to the 
Notice, and any FCC decision regarding diversification of broad-
cast ownership should include consideration of other sources of 
information. a. "[T]he appropriate concern is with information 
availability, not with market share."611 
In analyzing the question of diversity, the Notice notes that 
regulating national group owners may not solve the problem be-
cause even in national issues information is delivered locally.66 
While group owners can be viewed as national firms, the Notice 
expresses doubt about the "monolithic" control of information 
distribution.67 The Notice concludes that "absent evidence to 
the contrary," these outlets for information should be seen as 
quasi-independent or totally independent information sources.68 
As such, questions on ownership concentrations restricting di-
versity should be viewed from the local level.· 
The Notice also cites the findings of the FCC's Office of 
Plans and Policy (OPP).69 The OPP concludes "that the rele-
vant context for diversity consideration is the local market, be-
61. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49449, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976), 
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
62. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49449. 
63.1d. 
64.1d. 
65.1d. 
66.1d. 
67.1d. 
68. Id. The Commission requested '~any evidence that either local or national news 
which is locally originated by group owned stations represents the group's 'monolithic 
viewpoint.''' Id. 
69. J. D. Levy and F. Q. Setzer, Measurement of Concentration in Home Video 
Markets, FCC Office of Plans and Policy, (December 23, 1983) (unpublished report). 
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cause '[t]he range of choices available to viewers depends on the 
number of outlets available at the local level.' Multiple owner-
ship in outlets in separate markets does not limit that range."70 
The OPP regards national program delivery as merely a collec-
tion of local markets.71 The OPP report concludes that if local 
markets are competitive, there is no need for national or re-
gional ownership rules.72 
The next issue cited is whether there is a relationship be-
tween diversity of ownership and diversity of viewpoints. Citing 
the Commission's prior Notice of Proposed Rule-Making con-
cerning cross-ownership of cable and on-air broadcast systems,73 
this Notice states that increasing the number of owners does not 
necessarily increase the diversity of program content7• and sug-
gests that loosening the ownership restrictions may Increase 
original programming development.7G 
The last consideration under diversity of sources is whether 
the three major national networks should be considered under 
separate standards,76 and whether radio and television owner-
ship concentration should be considered separately." Request 
for comment on separate consideration for the national networks 
was based on the networks' programming dominance over 
prime-time viewing.78 The Notice cited potential alternatives as 
"maintajning the present seven stations ceiling and creating a 
new ceiling based on net weekly circulation or reach of owned 
stations."79 Regarding separate consideration of radio and televi-
sion, the Notice suggested this as a compromise choice, only if 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 45. 
72. [d., The OPP report contains no definition of a competitive or non-competitive 
market. It expressed. some guidelines regarding the number of independent voices 
needed for a local market to be deemed competitive. 
73. Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section 76.50 of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations Relative to Elimination of the Prohibition on Common Ownership of Cable 
Television Systems and National Television Networks, 47 Fed. Reg. 39212 (September 7, 
1982). 
74. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49450. 
75. [d. See supra, notes 43·47, and accompanying text. 
76. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49450-49451. 
77. [d., at 49451. 
78. [d., at 49450. 
79. [d. 
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the television rules were not amended to the degree suggested.80 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE NOTICE 
The first support offered by the Notice for amending the 
Seven Station rule is changed circumstances in the broadcast in-
dustry since 1953.81 While there is no doubt that three decades 
have changed and expanded broadcasting, the weight placed by 
the Notice on these changes may be greater than actually 
warranted. 
The Commission chose 1953 as its statistical year for mea-
suring changes in comparison with the current market.8s While 
1953 appears to be a logical point for comparison since it is the 
year the Seven Station Rule was issued, it may also be a signifi-
cantly misleading starting point. This is especially true when an-
alyzing on-air television growth.8s 
A brief review of the burgeoning television industry and ac-
companying FCC regulation in the years prior to 1953 sheds 
light on the state of television growth at the time chosen by the 
Notice for comparison to current markets. 
Commercial television began in earnest following World 
War 11.84 As a prelude to the expected interest in this new indus-
try, the FCC allocated thirteen carrier frequencies on VHF to 
commercial television (later reduced to twelve).80 By 1948, these 
12 channels were proving to be insufficient. On September 30, 
1948, the FCC imposed a freeze on the television licensing pro-
cedure in order to consider proper regulatory approaches to this 
so. [d., at 49451. The Notice clearly expressed the alternative nature of separate 
considerations. It noted the Commission's intent "to reduce our national broadcast own-
ership restrictions, ... to the maximum extent feasible .... n Separate considerations 
of radio concentration would only be considered if amendment to the television concen-
tration rules were rejected. 
81. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442-49445. 
82. [d. 
83. This is not the case with radio. Commercial radio has existed much longer, and 
was far more entrenched than television in 1953. Radio did not experience a sudden 
increase in the number of licensed stations immediately after the Seven Station Rule was 
promulgated. Thus, choosing the year 1953 for comparison is justifiable in radio, whereas 
with television, this is not the case. See infra, notes 84-96, and accompanying text. 
84. J. GRBENJlIELD, TELEVISION, THE FIRsT FIFTY YEARS, at 43 (1977). 
85. [d. 
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quickly expanding industry.s8 At the start of the freeze there 
were 108 operating stations in the U.S.S7 
In July, 1952, the freeze was lifted, and the FCC began issu-
ing licenses on both VHF and the newly adopted UHF fre-
quency.8S By the beginning of 1955, 567 television stations were 
authorized by the FCC, with 439 operating on the air.s9 These 
statistics are taken a mere three months after the 1954 amend-
ment finalized the Seven Station Rule.90 The number used for 
comparison to the current market in the Notice is 199 on-air sta-
tions as of 1953.91 This selection fails to account for the immedi-
ate boom of licensing after the freeze was lifted in the period 
from 1952-1956. In fact, the cause for freezing the licensing pro-
cedure was the inability of the FCC supply to keep up with the 
demand for new licenses.92 The Commission was undoubtedly 
cognizant that extensive growth in television licensing was immi-
nent when the Seven Station Rule was promulgated, and this 
expected growth was considered when the Commiss'ion selected 
its numerical ceiling. By using a deflated number, the argument 
of changed circumstances is somewhat weakened. In addition, 
the Notice cites the number of on-air television stations as 1,127 
as of June 30, 1983.98 However, this number includes non-com-
mercial stations.H As of November 30, 1983,867 commercial tel-
evision stations were operating, according to the FCC Daily Di-
gest.911 When compared with the 609 commercial stations with 
authority to broadcast by 1956, the Notice's claim of changed 
circumstances is greatly diluted (a percentage drop from 469% 
to approximately thirty percent increase).98 
The Notice also neglects to account for other factors when 
arguing changed circumstances in the industry. For example, the 
86. 13 Fed. Reg. 5860 (1948). 
87. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 179 (Kahn ed. 1984). 
88. Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952). 
89. Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook 1983, B-384 (1983). By the end of 1956, 
there were 609 commercial television stations authorized to broadcast by the FCC. FCC, 
22nd Annual Report, at 116 (1956). 
90. Supra, note 7. 
9l. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443. 
92. Supra, note 86. 
93. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443. 
94. Id., at n.57. 
95. FCC Daily Digest, December 19, 1983. 
96. FCC, 22nd Annual Report, at 116 (1956). 
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United States' population rose by approximately fifty percent 
from 1953 to the present.97 Thus, while the percentage of on-air 
stations has risen, the number of viewers served has also risen. 
Depending on the starting point chosen for comparison, the pop-
ulation increase may actually be greater than the on-air station 
increase. This also weakens the Notice's changed circumstances 
argument. 
The second prong of the Notice's claim for changed circum-
stances lies in the expansion of what can be termed new technol-
ogy.98 These new technologies are providing alternative news, 
entertainment, and commentary sources to traditional on-air tel-
evision, according to the Notice.99 The Notice cites the enor-
mous growth of cable television since 1953 as its leading argu-
ment.100 There is no doubt that cable television presently 
provides significant alternative sources of programming to a por-
tion of the American public. Arguably, its growth potential is 
also positive. However, the Notice fails to discuss cable's inher-
ent limitations. 
Cable presently reaches approximately forty percent of the 
nation's television households. 101 The Notice cites optimistic 
growth figures for the coming years.102 Yet no matter how large 
this forty percent figure looms in comparison to cable's past, the 
glaring fact remains that over 150 million Americans are without 
cable, so, as a means of communication, cable is nowhere near as 
significant in reach as on-air television for the majority of Amer-
icans. Also, cable does not have as large an impact on the Ameri-
can viewer as on-air television. loa 
97. U.S. population at the end of 1983 was approximately 233 million. U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., March 5, 1984, at 13, citing United States Census Bureau. U.S. population 
in 1953 was approximately 159 million. Historical Statistics of the United States, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, at Al-8. 
98. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49-43-49444. 
99. [d. 
100. [d., at 49443. 
101. [d. 
102. [d., at n. 61. 
103. A 1981 study by the Roper Organization shows that sixty-seven percent of the 
U.S. population turns to television as the source of most of its news. A Short Course in 
Broadcasting, Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook at A-2 (1981). In February of 1981, 
eight-six percent of the households without cable television watched network affiliate 
stations. Only fourteen percent watched other on-air stations. During the same time, of 
the homes with cable services, sixty-five percent watched network affiliated stations. The 
13
King: FCC and Media Regulation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
412 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:399 
Another problem with using cable in comparison to on-air 
television is cable's prohibitive cost. To obtain cable services, an 
installment fee and refundable equipment' deposit is generally 
required. In addition, a monthly entertainment fee is charged. 
The amount of this fee will depend on the level and amount of 
entertainment desired.lM For many, cable costs prohibit service. 
For others who are able to afford basic cable services, the vol-
ume of service received is directly related to spending capability. 
The Notice cites numerous new technologies such as MDS, 
STV, DBS and video recorders as other new alternatives to on-
air television. 1011 However, the statistics offered in the Notice re-
flect the minute impact these new technologies have had on the 
current market. With the exception of VCRs,106 all of the new 
technologies suggested in the Notice combine for a total of one 
million subscribers.l07 Assuming that all of these subscribers are 
from different households and that each household contains four 
members, the total reach of the new technologies is less than two 
percent of the nation's population. The Notice includes these 
new technologies as viable alternatives to on-air television 
mainly because of potential future growth. l08 However, glowing 
prospects for growth may not exist. For example, STV is now 
available through nineteen stations. lOB This number is down 
from twenty-seven stations in the early 1980's. Subscription 
levels are also down. While this may not indicate a dying or 
stagnant industry, it also doesn't indicate rosy prospects for im-
mediate impact on diversity of programming sources to the vast 
majority of Americans. no 
remaining percentage was divided among pay cable and other on-air stations. Neilsen 
Television Index Estimates, NEILSEN REPORT ON TELEVlSION at 12 (1981). 
104. BALDWIN & McCoy, CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, at 3, 126, 128, 130-33 (1983). 
105. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443-44. 
106. VCR's are playback recorders. Their capacity as a source of communication is 
limited to regurgitating information, entertainment, etc. derived from other sources. 
VCR's do not exist as original sources or communicators ofinformation. As such, includ-
ing this product as an alternative source which is expanding diversity is improper. 
107. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443-44. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Bloom is Off TV Rose, BROADCASTING, September 5, 1983 at 36. Another alter-
native programming source suggested in the Notice, MDS, only adds one additional 
channel. The FTC has re-allocated spectrum for multi-channel MDS system, but only 
one experimental system is operating at this time. Even when fully operational, MDS 
only provides four channels, and can exist in very limited circumstances. Eight DBS 
licensees are authorized by the Commission, and high powered systems are not expected 
14
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Taking all the evidence offered in the Notice into considera-
tion, there appears to be some level of "changed circumstances" 
in the industry since 1953. Most positively, this occurs in cable 
television. Those receiving cable have increased their diversity of 
available sources extensively. For example, some cable systems 
offer viewers more than twenty channels. Some of these systems 
include on-air stations from other cities, and all-new stations, as 
well as traditional television. format. To the degree that cable 
has grown, the FCC's argument of changed circumstances is 
supportable. 
Another strong argument for changed circumstances is the 
growth of the "new technologies." By taking these potential 
sources of diverse programming into consideration, the FCC ap-
pears to be regulating for future industry. Since any amendment 
to the Seven Station Rule will be controlling the future owner-
ship policies of broadcasting, the Commission is looking in the 
proper direction for solutions. However, a closer review of these 
new technologieslll shows that the FCC may be looking too far 
into the future for proper regulation of today's industry. If these 
technologies succeed in the future and provide expanded broad-
casting sources, new amendments (and/or abolishment> of media 
ownership rules can be considered. Until substantial changes oc-
cur, these new technologies should be measured by their present 
impact, plus any reasonably conceivable growth over the next 
few years. The unstable nature of these new technologies, cou-
pled with their inconsistent growth patterns, make regulation 
based on projected growth mere speculation. 
The second argument offered in the Notice is the arbitrary 
selection of the number "seven" as the ceiling in the media con-
centration rules. ll2 As discussed above, the FCC undoubtedly re-
alized the arbitrariness of numerical ceilings when the Rule was 
promulgated in 1953. However, as the history of the Commission 
in the 1950's and early 1960's shows, alternative approaches to 
numerical limitations were rejected. 113 
for several years. BROADCASTING, February 7, 1983 at 31, 37. No low-powered television 
stations are currently in operation and no license will be granted in urban areas for sev-
eral years. 48 Fed. Reg. 27, 182 (1983). 
111. See supra and infra notes 100-19 and accompanying text. 
112. NOTICE, at 49442-49443. 
113. Following the promulgation of the 7/7/7 Rule in 1953, several congressional 
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"The overall choices in approaching the media concentration 
rules boil down to two categories: The first is total elimination of 
ownership rules, with concentration concerns being guided by 
antitrust laws administered by the DOJ and the FTC. The sec-
ond choice is some standard based on a mathematical formula, 
such as a numerical ceiling like the one currently used or a 
formula based on a percentage of some measurable aspect of 
concentration, like the proposed Bricker Amendment. 114 
The FCC has indicated that total elimination of the concen-
tration rules may be the long term goal of any amendment to 
the Seven Station Rule.l1II If the FCC removes itself from moni-
toring concentration, the services of other federal agencies will 
be needed to check the broadcasting industry under the anti-
trust laws.ll6 This prospect presents some positive features. The 
media concentration laws are in part based on antitrust princi-
ples. Use of the antitrust laws to enforce the principles behind 
the media concentration rules appears to be a logical extension 
of the Rule. If true concentration exists in any broadcasting in-
dustry, or any combination of broadcasting industries, tradi-
tional antitrust laws could be applied. This might have the same 
effect on economic concentration in broadcasting as it does on 
economic concentration in other industries. 
Momentarily assuming that use of antitrust laws does not 
ignore the diversity principles of the Seven Station Rule, several 
problems remain. One problem is drawing the proper guidelines 
to determine concentration using the antitrust law. The Notice 
suggests development of a methodology to assess economic con-
studies were taken, aimed at limiting network control over the airwaves. One study, the 
"Network Monopoly" Report, or the Bricker Report (after Sen. John Bricker of Ohio) 
proposed dropping the 7/7/7 Rule in favor of a coverage limitation. The Bricker rule 
would forbid any single entity from owning television stations having coverage of more 
than twenty-five percent of the nation's population. (At the time owned and operated 
stations of NBC covered 23% of the nation's population, CBS covered 20% and ABC 
covered 29%.) This proposal never came to vote in Congress. The FCC also considered 
judging media concentration on a case-by case basis. This was also rejected. Several 
other investigations were made by both the FCC and Congress into methods of control-
ling the growing power of the networks. All of these proposals were rejected, and the 7/7/ 
7 Rule remained. Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. 
COMM. BAR J. I, 21-39 (1974). 
114. [d. 
115. NOTICE at 48 Fed. Reg. 49451. 
116. [d., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446-47. 
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centration in relevant markets.1l7 Markets considered relevant 
are geographic and product markets. The Notice cites the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) presently used by the DOJ 
as a possible tool to measure economic concentration. 118 
There may be some difficulties in switching from antitrust 
principles to antitrust law. The principles govern the broad na-
ture of antitrust: preventing concentration. The law is more spe-
cific and requires a well-defined market, one in which there is a 
direct relationship between a buyer and seller, and a price for 
the goods or service involved. In broadcasting, the broadcaster-
advertiser relationship falls into a traditional market scenario. 
As . such, regulation of these relations under antitrust law ap-
pears feasible. However, this broadcaster-advertiser relationship 
fails to include impact on the most important party - the 
viewer. 
The economic impact on the viewer is difficult to discern. 
Although the viewer pays no direct fee for the service received, 
the general consuming public will eventually bear the cost of an 
imbalanced economic relationship between advertiser and 
broadcaster. Finding the proper index to measure such a nebu~ 
lous relationship may prove difficult.ll9 The Notice neglected to 
offer a reasonable index to measure the impact on the viewer of 
such transactions. Until a proper index is formulated, use of an-
titrust law may prove to be an inadequate protection for the 
viewer. 
If such antitrust laws could be implemented to ensure the 
diversity principles entwined within the media concentration 
rules, a transition of this nature could solve the problem. How-
117. [d., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49447-48. 
118. [d. Using the HHI, the Notice draws a favorable comparison between concen-
tration in broadcasting and other industries such as refrigerators and breakfast cereals. 
This comparison is perhaps the best argument as to why antitrust laws are an inade-
quate measure of concentration in broadcasting. Economic control of the major sources 
. of information dissemination in the U.S. could be dangerous to the diversity of informa-
tion necessary for a functioning democracy. If the concentration levels of broadcasting 
are such that program and information alternatives dwindle, the options are not simple 
or readily available. The counter argument to this is that indices can be adjusted to 
reasonably measure economic concentration in broadcasting. Because of television's 
unique situation, more stringent controls could be adopted than are used in other 
industries. 
119. See, supra, notes 58-60, and accompanying text. 
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ever, because antitrust laws are economically oriented, adapta-
tion of these laws to first amendment principles is difficult. In 
fact, the focus on exchanging the numerical ceiling for antitrust 
law will bring economic concentration to the forefront of what 
had previously been a two-pronged regulatory focus. Replacing 
the Seven Station Rule with antitrust laws makes economic con-
centration the sole factor in regulating concentration in the in-
dustry. The issue of diversity of information sources, as a first 
amendment principle, becomes a secondary factor (if it remains 
a factor at all). 
Rejecting or emasculating the first amendment impact on 
the media concentration rules goes against a half-century of reg-
ulatory policy.120 The important issue in any change of broad-
cast regulatory policy is its impact on the viewers.l21 From a first 
amendment standpoint, this means the affect on the viewer's 
right to receive all possible information from a diverse market-
place of ideas.122 Strong statistical support should unequivocally 
be established by the Commission to show that the viewers' first 
amendment rights are not impaired. This proposed change is 
primarily based on the alleged weakening of the scarcity ration-
ale.128 Given the weak statistical support offered by the Commis-
sion in the Notice for the end to scarcity,iU such a radical de-
parture from tradition may constitute blind deregulation under 
the guise of progress. 
The vast majority of citizens receive much of their informa-
tion through traditional on-air television sources.12II Breaking 
this down further, most viewers receive information from sta-
tions on VHF.126 VHF is thoroughly dominated by the three ma-
jor networks and their affiliatees.l2'7 Contrary to arguments of-
120. See generally, National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190; Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367; CBS, Inc. v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. 367. 
121. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. at 390. 
122. [d. 
123. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442-45. 
124. See supra, notes 81-111 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra, note 103. 
126. [d. This information shows the dominance of the three networks in viewer au-
dience share. The networks broadcast almost completely on VHF, see infra, notes 127-
141, and accompanying text. 
127. FCC, 45th Annual Report, 100-01 (1979). This cite notes the Television Finan-
cial Data. Of the 513 VHF stations listed, fifteen are network owned, 469 are network 
affiliated, and twenty-nine are independent. 
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fered in the Notice, statistics show that the three major 
networks control a large portion of the on-air television pro-
gramming, including news coverage.12B While other sources are 
available, they pale in comparison to VHF television in terms of 
viewer impact. If it were merely a matter of consumer preference 
for one set of equal competitors over another, the effect might 
be irrelevant. However, years of marketplace competition, par-
tially nurtured by FCC regulation,129 have placed the VHF me-
dium and the three major networks above all other electronic 
media. To argue that scarcity has ended without analyzing the 
most dominant medium in the United States is negligent regula-
tory planning. Changes. in the media concentration rules will 
have significant impact on viewer first amendment rights, and 
should not be blithely dismissed without further consideration. 
Because of the importance of first amendment considerations, 
antitrust law will likely prove an inadequate alternative. 
If antitrust laws are inadequate standards, other non-arbi-
trary alternatives should be examined. The Notice indicates an 
interim step of fourteen television stations, and thirty-six radio 
stations is being considered.130 These expanded numbers permit 
greater latitude in ownership, but absent any logical support for 
these new numbers, this solution seems as arbitrary as the Seven 
Station Rule.131 Arguing that the Seven Station Rule is arbi-
trary, and replacing it with new and equally arbitrary numbers 
may not be sufficiently logical to support such a major change. 
Another alternative is limiting ownership to a percentage of 
the total market. This was considered and rejected in the 1950's 
mainly because of administrative difficulties.132 A percentage 
128. New Television Networks: Entry, Jurisdiction, Ownership and Regulation, Vol-
ume I. Final Report: Network Inquiry Special Staff, F.C.C., October, 1980, at 228-30 
(hereafter cited as NETWORK INQUlRY). 
129. See supra, note 120. 
130. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49450-52. 
131. This is probably not the case in radio. The numbers for comparison in arguing 
changes in circumstances in radio do not suffer from the same deficiencies as those used 
by the Commission when comparing television. Radio has a larger number of stations 
available for commercial ownership than does television, making scarcity a smaller prob-
lem. Also, regional radio networks do not suffer the same competitive disadvantages as 
regional television networks when competing against national networks. Therefore, arbi-
trary numbers such as those suggested may not have the same stifling effect on radio as 
they would on television. 
132. See supra, note 113. 
19
King: FCC and Media Regulation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
418 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:399 
reach alternative such as this would also be inherently arbitrary. 
As such, it assumedly would be rejected under the reasoning 
contained in the Notice. 
The third reason offered in the Notice for amending the 
Seven Station Rule is that the Rule may actually limit diver-
sity.lsS The reasoning offered is that the inability of group own-
ers to own a sufficient number of stations "to generate a base for 
quality program production"184 prevents additional major na-
tional networks from forming. 18& The conceptual idea of this rea-
soning can be broken down into an equation. To achieve diver-
sity, national networks are necessary and for national networks 
to exist, ownership of numerous stations is necessary. While the 
need for competition among the major national networks corre-
sponds with the concept of diversity, the need for owning nu-
merous stations does not necessarily correspond with the con-
cept of national networks. ls8 
Herein lies the difficulty of analyzing the Seven Station 
Rule within strict ownership concepts. Ownership is merely one 
factor in determining the viability of national networks. A more 
important concept may be affiliation.ls7 Since there are over 200 
133. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442-43, 49446-47. 
134. Id., at 49446. 
135. Id. 
136. Any argument relating to diversity and ownership strongly implies that monop-
oly ownership equals monopoly viewpoint. In essence, it assumes that each station own-
er's viewpoint will necessarily be the viewpoint of the station. In making this assump-
tion, the editorial powers of both station management and reporters are presumed 
secondary to those of the station owner. This presumption, while debatable, has its roots 
in the early history of the multiple ownership rules. The limitations on ownership were 
placed, in part, on the reasoning that station ownership equals station viewpoint, how-
ever, any analysis regarding editorial control over a station is best undertaken on a case-
by-case bias. While it is arguable that both the station owners and their editorial boards 
will both have significant impact on station viewpoint, both the FCC and this article 
follow the presumption of owners having a stronger imput. A second prong of this issue 
is separating editorial and entertainment viewpoint within the same station. Both are 
likely to be influenced by separate groups or individuals within the sanIe station (as well 
as the owner(s». In some cases, the "viewpoint" may differ with each division within the 
station. 
These factors tend to cloud any definition of each station's viewpoint. However, as 
with most business entities, the final decisions are made by, and are the responsibilities 
of the owriers. In light of this ultimate decision-making power, the FCC's focus on own-
ership as representing the broad viewpoint of a station becomes clearer. 
137. A general outline of network features is as follows: Each of the three existing 
networks owns, or is affiliated with a group of stations that collectively broadcast to mar-
kets containing virtually all viewers in the United States. Network programming that is 
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television markets in the United States, the Seven Station Rule 
distributed to affiliates is typically shown at the same time by all affiliates operating 
within the same time zone. Approximately 85 to 100 hours of programming are made 
available by the networks to the affiliates. The networks sell advertising time within 
most network programs to national advertisers who want to have their advertising car-
ried by all of the network's affiliates, although some commercial advertising time or net-
work programming is left for sale by affiliates. Each network produces several of its own 
programs, and finances the production of virtually all other programs that it carries on a 
network basis. 
A typical affiliate-network contract works as follows: Much of the programming is 
provided by the networks. The networks either produce it themselves, or purchase it 
from independent sources. The networks then purchase access time on the affiliate sta-
tions. The method used is either a direct.cash payment to the affiliate or air time is made 
available during and between programming for direct sale by the affiliate stations to 
advertisers. In the alternative, the advertising is provided by the national networks to 
their affiliates, with a percentage of the earnings flowing from the networks to the affili-
ate. Time slots are created during and between programs for advertising which may be 
provided by the network, or may be sold by the individual stations. Earnings from the 
advertising are divided according to individual contract terms. Also, percentage of the 
time that must remain open to national advertising vary from contract to contract. In 
addition to advertising earnings, affiliate stations are compensated by the networks for 
carrying network programs. This often amounts to a substantial percentage of station 
revenue. The advantage of networking to both networks and the affiliates make involve-
ment in this form of enterprise economically desirable. The first advantage is spreading 
the cost of program production over a larger number of stations. Once a program is pro-
duced for one station, no additional production costs are incurred when the program is 
shown on other stations. This does not necessarily guarantee a higher quality program, 
but it will generally prevent expensive production costs from derailing a project. 
A second advantage is simultaneous transmission of programs within the same time 
zone. With simultaneous transmission, the size and composition of a potential audience 
that an advertiser can reach will be easier and more accurately predicted than if the 
same program was shown at different times. 
Additionally, simultaneous transmission may help reduce distribution costs since it 
becomes possible to employ electronic interconnection. If the program is now shown si-
multaneously, three typical alternatives are possible. Separate prints of the program may 
be made and distributed. In the alternative, either the affiliate stations must tape the 
program for later use, or the network must make multiple feeds to the affiliate at differ-
ent times. All the alternatives add expense to the dissemination of programming. 
Another advantage of simultaneous transmission is facilitation of advance promotion 
of the program. The program can air simultaneously on all network affiliates, as well as 
appear in magazines, radio, newspapers, etc. on a national basis, thereby reducing pro-
duction and distribution costs. Also, air time that ordinarily would be used to promote a 
program could be saved for sale to advertisers. 
The next advantage is seen in all phases of advertising sales. Both the network and 
its individual affiliate stations sell advertising time. Having national network advertising 
as an option adds an attractive economic lure to the networks for the national advertiser 
(and, in turn the economic benefits to the networks of having top-dollar advertisers as 
customers). Transaction costs are lower than if an advertiser had to contact each station 
individually. Thus, the advertiser saves expenditures prior to purchase of national adver-
tising time. Another benefit to advertisers is the ability to reach the entire country at 
once. Certain programs that are likely to draw exceptionally large national audiences will 
attract national advertisers hoping to impact upon a larger audience than is typically 
watching television at that time. NETWORK INQUIRY, at 228-29, 231-34, 446-52. 
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eliminates the possibility of outright ownership of a national 
network by an individual or corporate entity. In order for a com-
mercial broadcaster to regularly broadcast its programming on a 
national scale, the formation of affiliate contracts with numerous 
independent stations is necessary. Although no strict definition 
of "national" network is employed, ABC, NBC and CBS all 
reach greater than ninety percent of the more than 200 televi-
sion markets in the V.S.m These three networks have success-
fully established and maintained a sufficient number of affiliate 
stations to be considered national. The ownership limitations 
have only marginally obstructed this procedure. With these 
three networks operating under the current regulatory frame-
work, it is apparent that the ownership limitations are not an 
absolute bar to national networking. 
138. As of 1980, ABC had 203 affiliates, CBS had 198, and NBC had 212. 1980 
Broadcasting/Cable Yearbook D-24, D-33, D-39. In addition, each network ownS five sta-
tions. ABC reaches 98.1% of the nation's households, CBS reaches 96.5%, and NBC 
reaches 96.9%. 44 Fed. Reg. 36.63 (1978). 
The three existing national networks own or affiliate with approximately 600 of 
these stations. That leaves about 270 stations available for affiliation with other group 
owners desiring national network status. Affiliates are not exclusively bound to anyone 
network. The FCC has established several regulations governing network-affiliate rela-
tionships. A sampling of these regulations are as follows: Network affiliations contracts 
cannot bind a station to a network for more than two years. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (c) (1979). 
These contracts cannot bar affiliates from broadcasting programs of another network. 47 
C.F.R. § 73.658 (a) (1979). Conversely, affiliates are not permitted to prevent other sta-
tions in the'same geographic area from broadcasting network programs not taken by that 
affiliate. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1979). The affiliate station has a right to reject network 
programs offered or contracted for if the the affiliate reasonably believes the program is 
unsatisfactory, unsuitable, contrary to the public interest, or if the station chooses to 
substitute programming it believes is of greater importance. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (e) 
(1979). Networks are not permitted to, contract for any option time on the affiliate sta-
tions. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (d) (1979). 
Even though the requisite number of stations are available, there is no guarantee 
that these stations will cover enough markets for national network status. For example, 
both New York City and Los Angeles will have several stations left over after three are 
owned or affiliated with ABC, NBC, and CBS. However, many smaller markets either do 
not have, or cannot support more than three stations. Therefore, if the three networks 
enter a smaller market though affiliation, others are likely to be excluded. 
Also, because the three national networks have been successful for several decades, 
independent VHF stations almost always find the three national networks a more attrac-
tive package, both economically and in available programming. Having a greater number 
of stations available with which to spread programming costs increases the national net-
work's ability to produce and distribute programming. This advantage brings economic 
benefit to all parties involved. This vicious cycle (a large number of affiliates available to 
distribute programming lead to lower cost of production and distribution which equals 
greater gain, makes networks more desirable to affiliates) keeps the networks in an un-
matched position, and works to keep others out of the national network competition. 
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Alternatives to the Seven Station Rule based upon a strict 
ownership analysis are not likely to change things. For example, 
if the Seven Station Rule is amended to allow ownership of four-
teen or twenty-one television stations, massive affiliation will 
still be necessary to achieve national status. If ownership limita-
tions are completely abolished, then individuals could conceiva-
ble own their own networks. However, ownership of close to 200 
stations by several entities would (or at least should) violate an-
titrust standards under the indexes offered in the Notice. Theo-
retically, ownership of that many television stations would be 
unallowable. No matter how the problem is approached, some 
form of affiliation will' still be needed. Logically, it might be 
more productive to examine the network-affiliate rules as well as 
the ownership rules, if lack of diversity among the national net-
works is a problem. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE SEVEN STA-
TION RULE 
The Commission notes the importance of national and re-
gional networks in providing the best service to the public. Uti 
However, they generally ignore the large role national network-
ing plays in determining the diversity of information available to 
the viewing public. This impact cannot be properly analyzed 
within the narrow confines of the station ownership rules if 
other factors such as frequency, network-affiliate relationships 
and program supply are not considered. The FCC should ana-
lyze potential changes in all of these components when consider-
ing amendment of the Seven Station Rule. 
The success of the three networks at creating and maintain-
ing their affiliate contacts has vaulted them to a position of 
prominence, while almost completely reducing competition on a 
national scale. Virtually every VHF licensed station in the 
United States is owned or affiliated with one of the three major 
networks.140 All three networks broadcast predominantly on 
VHF.HI The turnover rate among affiliate stations is minimal, 
139. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446. 
140. See supra, note 127. 
141. Id. The networks affiliate with approximately 600 stati~ns combined, and the 
1979 FCC Annual Report lists 484 of the 513 VHF stations in the U.S. as owned or 
affiliated with the networks. 
23
King: FCC and Media Regulation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
422 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:399 
and when any turnover occurs, the station invariably leaves one 
major network for another.142 
FCC policy over the years has played a large role in creating 
this current scenario. In the post World War II years, the UHF 
frequency, although capable of containing five and one-half 
times as many channels per market than VHF, was rejected by 
the FCC in favor of VHF. us This was partly because of lobbying 
efforts by the leading radio networks that were seeking entrance 
into the television markets. The radio equipment of that era was 
easily adapted to VHF. 144 If VHF was chosen as the television 
frequency, enormous saving could be made on equipment, per-
sonnel training, and other expenses. The plan was to eventually 
move all television to UHF because of its superior channel-hold-
ing capabilities which would open television to a broader num-
ber of owners.14lI By 1948, the FCC, unable to keep up with de-
mand for licenses using only VHF, initiated its license freeze. 
During this freeze, the early television networks cemented 
their affiliation contacts. Since there were few licenses, those 
companies with prior networking experience in radio had a natu-
ral advantage over newcomers to the industry. There were also 
very few newcomers because the freeze began before commercial 
television moved beyond the experimental stage. Also, once the 
freeze was lifted four years later, the early networks were estab-
lished bastions of the industry. The most economically lucrative 
arrangement for a new licensee was to affiliate with an industry 
leader. The economic benefits of networking advanced with each 
newly added affiliate, making changes in the arrangement eco-
nomically disadvantageous. New network competition was virtu-
ally impossible. New licensees, faced with the choice of affiliat-
ing and sharing economic benefits with an established multi-
market network or affiliating with a novice, limited-market net-
work almost always chose the former. 
142. NETWORK INQUIRY supra, note 129, at 163-167. The FCC Special Staff reviewed 
affiliate turnover during the period 1968-1977. A total of 46 affiliate stations left their 
network during these years. All moved to affiliation with another major network. 
143. Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications 
Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 70S, 707-708 (1975), citing, Allocations Report of May IS, 
1945, FCC No. 6651, at 99-100, 1 P&F Radio Reg. (Part 3) Sec. 91.67. 
144. [d. 
145. [d. 
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A second result of the freeze was the fate of UHF television. 
When the freeze was lifted, the FCC decided to allocate part of 
UHF to television.146 One drawback to the delay was that in the 
interim, millions of television sets had been sold containing only 
VHF dials. In order to receive the new UHF stations, the view-
ing public would have to purchase either new sets or UHF 
adapters. The adapters were often of poor quality, which made 
clear UHF reception difficult. 
The FCC next made the decision that sealed the fate of 
UHF. They decided to intermix stations of both frequencies 
within the same markets.1(7 There had been demand to separate 
the two frequencies in order that new UHF stations would not 
have to compete with established VHF stations in the same mar-
ket.148 Many commentators and industry leaders felt UHF could 
not survive in direct competition with VHF, given the historical 
development of FCC policy.H9 These analyses were proved cor-
rect when the FCC intermixed the fr~quencies. UHF was 
doomed to an inferior status. 160 
This major network domination presents two problems to 
other networks seeking national status. The first can be termed 
a coverage handicap. This occurs if all of the commercial chan-
nels assigned to a given market are affiliated with some or all of 
the three national networks. There are no assignments available 
for affiliation with a potential entrant and that entrant is effec-
tively closed out of a market. un The second problem is a techni-
cal handicap. If the only channel available for affiliation with a 
new entrant is a UHF station, and the three national networks 
are operating on VHF, the new entrant will be forced to compete 
using a technologically inferior station.162 If either problem oc-
curs in enough television markets, the new entrant will not be 
able to telecast nationally. Since the VHF stations are virtually 
146. 41 F.C.C. 148, 154 (1952). 
147. [d. at 205-209. 
148. [d. 
149. See generally, The Darkened Channels: UHF Television and the FCC, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1962). 
150: [d. 
151. Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Net-
works: The Federal Communications Commission's Spectrum Management Policies, 54 
So. CALIF. L. REV. 875, 879 (1981). . 
152. [d., at 879-880. 
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closed off to all but the three networks,1113 these handicaps alone 
end the possibility for a fourth national network under present 
conditions. 
This vicious cycle has existed for the entire history of televi-
sion in this county. The Notice acknowledges this problem as an 
affront to the FCC diversity principles. 1M It concludes that elim-
inating the media ownership rules would allow new entrants to 
gain a proper foothold by permitting ownership of a sufficient 
number of stations in which to create a base for quality pro-
gramming. This, in turn, would make affiliation with these net-
works desirable. ll1l1In this analysis, the Notice overlooks the 
VHF !UHF handicap. The current VHF allocation supports only 
three national networks. Unless VHF allocation to television is 
expanded,1I58 additional new networks would have to be formed 
entirely on UHF, an approach that has failed in the past and is 
likely to fail in the future. Those purchasing VHF stations 
would have the same advantage as those currently affiliating 
with VHF stations. The only change would be that networks 
would be owned instead of affiliated combinations. In addition, 
outright ownership of VHF networks by three entities com-
pletely destroys any notions of diversity currently enjoyed. 
This emphasis on ownership, without consideration of other 
essential factors, is the basic failing of the Notice. If all the es-
sential factors are considered together, and amending the Seven 
Station Rule is reviewed in context with amending other regula-
tory policy, perhaps the FCC goal of diversity through new na-
tional networks could be a reality. 
V. PROPOSAL 
Television marketplace history has provided that no na-
tional network can compete without a significant number of 
153. NETWORK INQUIRY, at 163-167. 
154. NOTICE, at 48 F.2d Reg. 49442-43, 49446-47. 
155. [d. 
156. The FCC is allocated forty-eight percent of the VHF band. The remaining 
fifty-two percent is divided among other government agencies. Of the VHF allocation, 
the FCC has allocated 55.8 percent to television. 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (1979). Thus, televi-
sion occupies about twenty-five percent of the total VHF band. It is conceivable for the 
FCC to expand the VHF allocation to television. Such action would be at the expense of 
other groups occupying the band such as police and fire departments. 
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VHF channels. It is also evident that affiliates will never leave 
the three major networks for a novice network under the current 
regulatory system.III'1 The failure of the FCC to numerically limit 
network affiliation with VHF licensed stations has led to an in-
directly sanctioned monoplization of the national airwaves by 
three networks. By allowing indirect monopolization to persist, 
the FCC has allowed the principles behind the· Seven Station 
Rule to be eroded. Alterations in the ownership rules merely 
perpetuate this monopolization under the guise of creating and 
supporting diversity. 
As an alternative to the vague amendments of the Seven 
Station Rule offered in the Notice,1II8 The FCC should consider 
the following alternative proposals. First, the FCC should nu-
merically limit network affiliation with VHF stations. Second, 
the FCC should maintain the VHF station ownership limits at 
five, and expand the UHF ownership limit to a significant 
enough percentage of markets needed for developing and/or 
maintaining a national market. 
The purpose behind the first proposal can be seen through 
the following example: The FCC numerically limits affiliation 
with VHF licensed stations to forty-five. IllS Assuming the three 
existing national networks own five VHF stations and affiliate 
with up to the new numerical limit, they would cover 150 out of 
the approximately 530 existing VHF stations. This is in compar-
ison to the approximately 500 VHF stations currently affiliated 
with the three networks. This reduction would open approxi-
mately 340 VHF stations for affiliation with other group owners 
seeking the formation of a national network .. 
The second part of the proposal is offered as a buffer to the 
consequences of the first proposal. When the networks are re-
.. stricted by the VHF affiliation limits, it will block approximately 
three-quarters of the markets necessary to telecast nationally. 
This gap must be compensated by UHF stations. Many markets 
157. NETWORK INQUIRY, at 163-67. 
158. See supra, notes 17 and 18, and accompanying text. 
159. This number is used for strictly hypothetical purposes. If a proposal such as 
this is adopted, the numerical limits on VHF affiliation chosen by the FCC should allow 
any developing new networks to affiliate with a sufficient enough number of VHF sta-
tions to create the necessary base for national networking. 
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only support a few, if any, independent UHF stations. Thus, the 
possibility exists· of networks needing affiliation into specific 
markets, and having an insufficient number of independent 
UHF stations available. If the UHF ownership limits are ex-
panded, this problem could be alleviated by allowing networks 
to file for a UHF license in markets where affiliation is impossi-
ble. leo This combination of the two proposals creates a situation 
where national networking can only be achieved through a mix 
of VHF and UHF stations. 
Analysis of potential network competition must be done on 
both national and local levels. Nationally, the competitive bal-
ance would be fostered by numerical equality of stations on 
VHF. The prior monopolization would no longer be permitted 
and each network could conceivable have an effective base of 
fifty VHF stations. Also, each network would affiliate with 
roughly the same number of UHF stations. The technical imbal-
ance among on-air stations currently stifling national competi-
tion would be partially alleviated. The inability of networks to 
maintain a quality base for programming is given in the Notice 
as a prime reason for the failure of new national networks to 
develop. leI With numerical limits on this quality base (i.e., suffi-
cient VHF stations), the vicious cycle which has prevented new 
national networks from forming will no longer be supported by 
regulatory indifference. The success or failure of new national 
networks will be determined to a· larger extent in the 
marketplace. 
Locally, the competitive balance in some markets might be 
drastically altered. One consequence of this Comment's pro-
posed regulation is the "divestment" of numerous affiliation con-
tracts by the three national networks. Their choice of which 
markets to maintain will undoubtedly vary. The impact on each 
individual market will be on whether the existing national net-
works maintain VHF affiliation or opt for ownership/affiliation 
160. Opening up UHF ownership to established networks may help achieve a long 
standing FCC goal - bolstering UHF television. It has been difficult for independent 
UHF stations to survive in many markets. However, a UHF station in these same mar-
kets may have a better chance of survival if it receives the advantages of networking. 
Ownership is proposed over affiliation, because the networks can establish new stations 
via ownership, whereas affiliation requires existing stations. 
161. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446. 
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on UHF. For example, a market has three available VHF chan-
nels; if NBC maintains VHF affiliation, and CBS and ABC opt 
for UHF, NBC will probably start off with an advantage. Con-
ceivably, two emerging networks would affiliate with the VHF 
stations, creating (at least) a five-station market. In the past, the 
two UHF stations would probably be weaker. However, if the 
two UHF stations have the benefit of affiliating with CBS and 
ABC, the prior UHF stigma may not automatically condemn 
these stations to second-class status. The public perception of 
UHF inferiority might change if familiar and popular network 
programming is broadcast on a UHF station. If this pattern oc-
curs, the hypothetical local market would have five fairly com-
petitive channels in the long run. 
Another conceivable scenario would have all three networks 
maintaining their VHF affiliate ties in a local market. This 
would maintain the status quo and keep potential networks at 
the same technical disadvantage as experienced at present. How-
ever, if the existing networks maintain VHF contacts in one 
market, other markets would be blocked from VHF affiliation 
under the new proposal. Therefore, new networks would have 
technical superiority over all three current national networks in 
some markets. 
In analyzing these consequences of such a drastic regulatory 
shift, the impact on three significant parties - the viewers, the 
individual stations, and the networks - must be reviewed. The 
most important group listed' above is the viewer, for the essential 
premise of the Communications Act is to regulate broadcasting 
in the public interest.182 One tenet of this philosophy is to pro-
vide the best possible service to each geographic locality!88 Ar-
guably, the three national networks provide quality service to 
each geographic locality under the current system. The three 
networks each cover most of the United States. Conceivably, 
these networks would occasionally be faced with the option to 
enter a small market by purchasing and operating a UHF sta-
tion. If the network chooses to forego such a market, that mar-
ket will be deprived of a significant programming option. 
162. See supra, note 1. 
163. This is regulated through the licensing procedure: "the CommiBBion shall make 
such distribution of licenses ... to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of 
radio service to each of [each radio market]." 47 U.S.C. § 307 (b) (1970). 
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However, this is unlikely for several reasons. First, if affilia-
tion into these markets is currently economically desirable, own-
ership of a station may prove equally or substantially more lu-. 
crative. Also, entrepreneurs might be lured into purchasing a 
UHF station with the hope of affiliating with a national network. 
Independent station owners in the smaller markets are currently 
affiliating with the three networks, and, except for shifting fre-
quencies, present circumstances would not be altered. The ulti-
mate impact on the viewer is one of inconvenience, rather than 
deprivation of service. 
The impact on the independent VHF stations will be more 
pronounced. Those not selected for continuing affiliation with 
their networks face the following choices: (1) remaining indepen-
dent, (2) affiliating with a new network, (3) selling their station 
to a new network, or (4) seizing the opportunity to establish a 
separate national network. Alternatively, these stations could 
opt to remain with their network, and trade their VHF license 
for a UHF license.uu By trading their frequency, a licensee is 
gambling that associating with a leading, established network is 
a wiser business choice than facing the new options by remain-
ing on VHF. With any of these selections, the licensee will face a 
difficult business choice, one that would not exist without fur-
ther regulatory tampering. The ensuing flux in the industry may 
render . some previously successful businesses into economic 
losers. 
The networks would also be placed in a forced transitory 
situation. For each, approximately three-quarters of their broad-
cast outlets will be shifted from VHF to UHF, with the attend-
ant possibility of lower revenues and diminished status in the 
industry. The three major networks will also take the brunt of 
any regulatory change, since no other network will be forced to 
break off affiliate ties. 
The justification for such radical changes lies in the basic 
premise of broadcast regulation. Broadcasters are licensees of 
the public trust who hold no ownership rights. when granted a 
license. The success of the networks is partially due to this li-
164. If these proposals were adopted, some preference should be granted to VHF 
licensees shifting to UHF licenses. 
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cense system.1611 In fact, FCC regulation may perpetuate the 
three networks' superior status, contrary to the public interest in 
diversity of sources. The FCC determination that the public in-
terest may be served better by numerous national networks sup-
ports policy aimed at diminishing the monopoly power of the 
three networks. Therefore, regulation reducing this control is 
conducive to promotion of the public interest standard. 
165. See supra, notes 143-151, and accompanying text. 
·Third-year student Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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